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OPTIMAL INVESTMENT, DERIVATIVE DEMAND AND ARBITRAGE
UNDER PRICE IMPACT
MICHAIL ANTHROPELOS, SCOTT ROBERTSON, AND KONSTANTINOS SPILIOPOULOS
Abstract. This paper studies the optimal investment problem with random endowment in an
inventory-based price impact model with competitive market makers. Our goal is to analyze how
price impact affects optimal policies, as well as both pricing rules and demand schedules for con-
tingent claims. For exponential market makers preferences, we establish two effects due to price
impact: constrained trading, and non-linear hedging costs. To the former, wealth processes in the
impact model are identified with those in a model without impact, but with constrained trading,
where the (random) constraint set is generically neither closed nor convex. Regarding hedging,
non-linear hedging costs motivate the study of arbitrage free prices for the claim. We provide three
such notions, which coincide in the frictionless case, but which dramatically differ in the presence
of price impact. Additionally, we show arbitrage opportunities, should they arise from claim prices,
can be exploited only for limited position sizes, and may be ignored if outweighed by hedging con-
siderations. We also show that arbitrage inducing prices may arise endogenously in equilibrium,
and that equilibrium positions are inversely proportional to the market makers’ representative risk
aversion. Therefore, large positions endogenously arise in the limit of either market maker risk
neutrality, or a large number of market makers.
1. Introduction
In this paper, we study the effects of inventory-based price impact on optimal investment, as
well as the pricing of, and optimal demand for, contingent claims. In our model, price impact
occurs endogenously when the investor submits an order to the market makers, as it changes their
aggregate inventory and hence pricing rule. Our goal is to understand how price impact in the
underlying market affects optimal investment in both the underlying assets and the claim. To
this end, we establish two primary effects due to price impact: constrained trading and non-linear
hedging costs.
Non-linear hedging costs mean that, even if the constraint is absent and the investor can fully
hedge any position on the claim, the cost of the hedging strategy is not linear with respect to
the position size, as it is in the frictionless case. This is due to price impact, and requires us
to both revisit the notion of arbitrage-free prices and ask whether it is always optimal to exploit
an arbitrage opportunity, since price impact in the underlying market may limit the arbitrage’s
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gains. Furthermore, non-linear costs naturally lead us to consider the investor’s demand schedule
(i.e. optimal demand for a given traded price) and ask whether it can ever be optimal to take
a large position in the claim. Motivated by [5], where for models without price impact, large
positions endogenously arise in conjunction with either vanishing hedging errors, risk aversion or
transactions costs, we want to examine whether optimal demands become large as the price impact
vanishes.
Rather than specifying the price impact of trades exogenously, as in [7, 18, 22, 33, 55, 43, 53, 48]
amongst others, we follow the financial economics paradigm, where the impact is determined
endogenously. We use the impact models first developed in [30, 56], and subsequently extended
by [9, 10]. Here, market makers compete when quoting prices for a given demand process. The
competition causes market makers to form Pareto optimal allocations, and cash balances to preserve
their expected utilities. The cash balance process then determines a wealth process for the large
investor. The problem of hedging claims in this setting was considered in the recent works [25, 50].
Here, as a natural counterpart, we consider the dynamic optimal investment problem with random
endowments (the corresponding static problem is studied in [4], while [24] contains partial results
in continuous time).
The first step is to examine the wealth process associated to a given investor trading strategy.
We show (as was done in [51] for a single asset) that under exponential preferences for the market
makers, wealth processes in the price impact model can be identified with those in fictitious market
without price impact, but with constrained trading. However, the constraint set varies with both
time and scenario, and as highlighted by examples in Section 2.3, typically it is neither closed nor
convex. As such, much of the standard theory for solving the investor’s portfolio choice problem
does not apply (c.f. [17]). Adding to the difficulty is that the (if finite) boundary of the constraint
set may correspond to an infinite investor demand in the price impact model, and at least formally,
infinite demands may lead to well defined wealth processes (see Section 3 for a more detailed
discussion). In order to rule out this situation, care must be taken when selecting the terminal
payoff of the traded assets, and its relationship to aggregate market maker endowment.
While general conclusions regarding optimal investment are lacking due to the nature of the
constraint set, it does turn out that in many cases of interest the constraint set is non-binding for
the optimal investment problem. For example, in the Bachelier model the constraint set is absent.
Additionally, in the general case, if the market makers’ and investor’s endowments are “securitized”
(portfolios of the traded assets plus an independent component) optimal policies are static, and
hence always admissible. Indeed, absent any exogenous order flow to the market makers (by other
investors or “noise traders”), the initial optimal order puts the large investor and the market
makers to a Pareto-optimal situation, and no further trading is necessary. We establish these
results by linking CARA investor preferences in the price impact model with CRRA preferences in
the constrained trading model.
Allowing for the above conclusions, our main focus is dedicated to identifying pricing rules and
demand schedules when price impact is present in the underlying market. We observe that hedging
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a position on a claim yields two separate but related questions: can we hedge? and how much does
it cost to hedge? To the second question we also ask if hedging costs are linear in the position size,
and if not, what are the consequences?
To isolate the effects of hedging costs upon optimal demands, we remove the constrained trading
effect, assuming for any position in the claim that a replicating strategy for that position exists.
Here, we show the hedging cost is not linear in the units of the claim. As impact enlists doubt
as to the scalability of arbitrage opportunities, non-linear hedging costs mandate we revisit the
notion of arbitrage-free pricing. For this, we provide three definitions of an arbitrage-free price,
which coincide in the frictionless case, but which in this price impact model, yield strikingly
different arbitrage-free price ranges. Indeed, we obtain arbitrage-free price ranges which vary
from a singleton all the way to the maximal interval, determined by claim’s essential infimum and
essential supremum.
While by definition a non-arbitrage free price gives rise to an arbitrage opportunity, due to
price impact, the gain from the arbitrage is limited in that it can be exploited only for small
(enough) positions in the claim: for large positions the arbitrage vanishes. This follows because
when the investor trades the arbitrage opportunity with the market makers, she changes their
inventory and hence pricing rules. After a certain threshold in the claim’s position size, hedging
becomes expensive and the arbitrage vanishes. Therefore, if the investor wants to buy/sell the
derivative for hedging reasons, she may ignore an arbitrage opportunity when the benefits from
hedging outweigh the limited gain from arbitrage. While this is in sharp contrast with the notion of
arbitrage in frictionless markets without price impact, it is consistent with the “limits to arbitrage”
evidence in markets with frictions such as capital constraints or transaction costs (see [1] for related
empirical results). Similar non-scalable arbitrage opportunities also appear in [28] for continuous-
time models with general market frictions. Lastly we comment that while pricing and demand
research for contingent claims is well studied in frictionless markets, corresponding studies in the
presence of price impact are scarce (for exceptions, see [40, 13]).
The above implies optimal demand for a claim may be finite even if the traded price allows
for arbitrage. In fact, optimal demands also depend on investor endowment and its relationship
with both the claim and underlying assets. But, when is the optimal demand large? To answer
this question we apply the results of [5] and show optimal demands are inversely proportional to
the (representative) market maker risk aversion. Thus, positions become large as either a single
market maker becomes risk neutral (a common assumption in microeconomics, c.f. [38]) or as the
number of market makers increases (since the representative risk tolerance aggregates individual
risk tolerances). As such, our results support the observed position sizes of over-the-counter (OTC)
derivatives, accounting for price impact, provided either a large number of market makers, or market
makers sufficiently close to risk-neutrality.
Lastly, we ask whether, and under which circumstances, the traded price for the claim (arbitrage-
free or not) arises endogenously in equilibrium. For this, we use the notion of Partial Equilibrium
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Price Quantities (PEPQ) as introduced in [6], where two large investors engage in an OTC trans-
action, at a price and quantity which is utility-optimal for each. However, as we deal with price
impact, care must be taken when describing exactly whom the investors are trading with in order
to hedge their risks. We take the perspective of a segmented market, which has recently attracted
significant attention (c.f. [45, 46]). Here, price impact is “local”, in that each investor trades in
her local market, with (local) market maker and traded assets. Then, the investors additionally
trade with each other on a separate claim, according to the PEPQ formulation. Segmentation
avoids the investors from hedging demands with the same market maker (and hence having to
declare a cash-balance sharing rule), and enables private trading of the derivative rather then em-
bedding the derivative into the previously existing traded assets. Assuming CARA preferences for
both investors, we provide sufficient conditions for the existence and the uniqueness of the PEPQ.
Remarkably, when the investors’ endowments are sufficiently different, the endogenously arising
equilibrium prices may not be arbitrage-free. Now, equilibrium prices that lie outside of the range
of arbitrage-free prices have appeared in the financial economics literature. For example, [35] shows
that arbitrage opportunities are compatible with equilibrium in a strategic security market model,
while in [16], arbitrage equilibrium prices occur under restricted participation and exogenous port-
folio constraints. However, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first time equilibrium arbitrage
prices appear in the context of contingent claim pricing.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the price impact model,
connect it with a fictitious market model with random constraints, and discuss the properties
of the constraint set. In Section 3, we specify to when the investor has exponential preferences
and provide examples where the constraint is non-binding. Section 4 is dedicated to contingent
claim demand, pricing and arbitrage. In Section 5 we endogenize the traded derivative prices and
positions using the PEPQ framework in segmented markets. Lastly, Appendix A contains proofs
of the main results.
2. The price impact model and fictitious market
2.1. The model. The inventory-based price impact model we consider was introduced in [30, 56]
and further developed in [9, 10]. There is a complete probability space (Ω,F ,P) which supports a
d-dimensional Brownian motion B, and we denote by F the P-augmentation of the natural filtration
for B, so F satisfies the usual conditions of right continuity and saturation at 0 of all P-null sets.
The time horizon is T > 0, and there are a finite number of securities with terminal payoff
denoted by the k-dimensional, FT measurable random vector Ψ1. Transactions on the securities
are made through a collection of market makers, who quote demand-based prices. The market
makers are risk averse, have random endowments, and for a given order q ∈ Rk, (aggregately) ask
a price X(q) ∈ R according to two conditions: (i) the total order, price and random endowment are
distributed between market makers in a Pareto-optimal way; and (ii) each market maker remains
at indifference (i.e. her expected utility remains unchanged) after the transaction. Every time
1Throughout, all random variables are assumed FT measurable.
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an order is satisfied by the market makers, their inventory and hence pricing rule changes. In
continuous time, both the order flow Q = {Qt}t≤T and the cash balance X(Q) = {Xt(Q)}t≤T are
adapted stochastic processes.
We assume exponential (CARA) preferences for the market makers. This allows us to consider
hereafter a single (representative) market maker. Indeed, it is well-known (see [11, 12, 57]) that the
Pareto-optimal sharing problem of exponential utility maximizers can be written as an optimization
problem of a representative agent, whose utility is again exponential, and whose risk tolerance and
endowment are, respectively, the sum of individual market makers’ risk tolerances and endowments.
Furthermore, condition (ii) above implies the cash balance asked by the market makers is the
indifference price of the representative agent (c.f. [9, Theorem 3.1], [10, Theorem 4.9]).
Remark 2.1. As argued in [56], the assumption of market makers’ indifference pricing is econom-
ically reasonable. It is justified not only by intense competition among market makers (see the
related discussion in [4] and [9]), but also by the well-documented fact that market makers are will-
ing to offer better prices to large investors (see [3, 27] and the references therein). In our setting,
“better price” means each market maker asks for the minimum price which compensates him for
the position (i.e. her indifference value).
The representative market maker has risk aversion γ > 0 and endowment Σ0. We make the
standing assumption on Σ0, γ and Ψ (c.f. [10, Assumption 2.4], [8, equation (15)]).
Assumption 2.2. For all q > 0, E
[
e−γΣ0+q|Ψ|
]
<∞.
Consider first a single period model. As in [9], we take the market maker’s perspective, and
assume an investor submits an order for −q ∈ Rk units of Ψ. By assumption, the market maker
quotes a cash balance X(q) to remain at indifference to the order. Since her endowment changes
from Σ0 to Σ0 +X(q) + q
′Ψ, X(q) must satisfy
E
[
−e−γ(Σ0+X(q)+q′Ψ)
]
= E
[−e−γΣ0] .
In other words, X(q) is the (seller’s) indifference price for −q units of Ψ, under risk aversion γ and
endowment Σ0. For the investor, the wealth associated to the order at the end of the period is
V (q) = −q′Ψ−X(q).
In continuous time (c.f. [10]), an order flow is submitted by the investor, in the form of an adapted
stochastic process Q, and the cash balance X(Q) is an induced stochastic process. Here, for each
t ∈ [0, T ], Qt is the cumulative number of securities sold by the investor to the market maker,
and Xt(Q) is the cumulative cash balance. As in the static case, X(Q) is determined through
the principle of market maker indifference. For a given Q, we denote by V (Q) = {Vt(Q)}t≤T
the investor’s gains process, in that Vt(Q) is the cash amount the investor will receive if she sells
her cumulative order (see [10, Equation (4.19)]). In analogy to static case, at the terminal time
VT (Q) = −Q′TΨ−XT (Q).
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To precisely identify V (Q), we need to introduce some notation. In view of Assumption 2.2, for
all q ∈ Rk the process
Nt(q) := E
[
e−γΣ0−γq
′Ψ∣∣Ft] ; t ≤ T,
is a strictly positive martingale, and hence by predictable representation, we may write
(2.1)
Nt(q)
N0(q)
= E
(∫ ·
0
Hs(q)
′dBs
)
t
; t ≤ T,
for some predictable process H(q). The map (t, ω, q) → Ht(q)(ω) is P(F) ⊗ B(Rk) measurable,
where P(F) is the F-predictable sigma-algebra, and in fact, H(q) is regular in q as described in [8,
Lemma 5.5], as well as in [44]. Next, define the class of processes
API :=
{
Q ∈ P(F) |
∫ T
0
|Ht(Qt)|2dt <∞ a.s.
}
.
Using [8, Theorem 3.2, Section 5.2], [10, Theorem 4.9], we obtain the following representation for
V (Q) in terms of H(Q). The proof of Lemma 2.3 is in Appendix A.
Lemma 2.3. Let Assumption 2.2 hold. Then, for Q ∈ API , V (Q) is well defined with
Vt(Q) =
1
γ
∫ t
0
(Hs(Qs)−Hs(0))′(dBs −Hs(0)ds)− 1
2γ
∫ t
0
|Hs(Qs)−Hs(0)|2 ds; t ≤ T.(2.2)
2.2. Price impact and constrained investment. We now show how wealth processes V (Q)
for Q ∈ API are directly related to wealth processes X(pi) obtained in a fictitious model with no
price impact, but where there is constrained trading. This fact was first shown (for a single asset)
in the PhD thesis [51]. It was subsequently observed (also for one asset) in the PhD thesis [50],
as well as the unpublished [24]. It was also implicitly alluded to, albeit in a much more abstract
setting, in the recent [25] (c.f. Condition 3.7). Here, we make the observation both more formal
and general, by allowing for a vector of securities. We emphasize the discussion on the constraint
set and exploit this representation to analyze the problem of contingent claim pricing and hedging
under price impact.
Consider a fictitious market where the money market account is set to 1. There are d tradeable
assets with an exogenously given price process S evolving according to
(2.3)
dSt
St
= λtdt+ dBt; t ≤ T,
for a (to-be-determined) predictable d-dimensional process λ, such that
∫ T
0 |λt|2dt < ∞, a.s..
Provided the requisite integrability, λ is the unique market price of risk and, by construction, there
is a unique measure Q0 on FT under which S is a true martingale. Q0 has density
(2.4)
dQ0
dP
∣∣∣∣
FT
= E
(
−
∫ ·
0
λ′tdBt
)
T
.
Self-financing trading strategies are denoted by pi, where piit is the proportion of wealth invested
in Si at t, i = 1, ..., d. We assume pi ∈ P(F) is such that ∫ T0 |pi2t |dt < ∞ a.s.. The wealth process
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induced by pi has dynamics
dXt(pi)
Xt(pi)
= pi′t (λtdt+ dBt) ; t ≤ T,
so that, with initial wealth X0 = e
γx, the log wealth process is
(2.5) log (Xt(pi)) = γx+
∫ t
0
pi′t(dBt + λtdt)−
1
2
∫ t
0
|pit|2dt; t ≤ T.
Now, if we define λ := −H(0), assume pi = H(Q) − H(0), and compare (2.5) with (2.2) we see
that, as processes,
(2.6) x+ V (Q) =
1
γ
log(X(pi)).
In other words, there is a direct connection between the wealth process (induced by pi) in the
fictitious market (2.3) and the gains process (induced by Q) in the market with price impact. The
requirement pit = Ht(Qt) − Ht(0) is similar to the invertibility conditions in [25, Condition 3.7],
[24, Section 4], and the bounded-ness condition in [50, Proposition 3.5].
Clearly, for Q ∈ API we can construct pi. To go in the reverse direction, we must have for
Leb[0,T ] almost every t ≤ T that P almost surely pit lies in the random constraint set Kot , where
Kt :=
{
Ht(q) | q ∈ Rk
}
; Kot :=
{
Ht(q)−Ht(0) | q ∈ Rk
}
.(2.7)
Therefore, we define the acceptable strategies
AC :=
{
pi ∈ P(F) |
∫ T
0
|pit|2dt <∞, pi ∈ Ko, Leb[0,T ] × P a.s.
}
.
In [8, Lemma 5.5] the map q → H(q) was shown to be continuous (in fact, the map is much more
regular: see [44]). Thus, by the Kuratowski-Ryll-Nardzewski measurable selection theorem for any
θ ∈ P(F) such that θt ∈ Kt a.s. for t ≤ T , we can select Q ∈ P(F) so that H(Q) = θ, Leb[0,T ] × P
a.s.. As such we have the equivalence Q ∈ API ⇔ pi ∈ AC for pi = H(Q) − H(0), and that
x+ V (Q) = (1/γ) log (X(pi)).
2.3. The constraint set. The constraint-set process Ko of (2.7) is determined by γ,Σ0 and Ψ.
In this section we construct three examples which show generally, for fixed (t, ω), that Kot (ω) is
neither closed or convex. This departs from the literature of utility maximization problem under
constraints, where both closed-ness and convexity are assumed, and creates a severe problem
when it comes to solving the investor’s optimal investment problem under price impact, as will be
discussed in the next section. In the first example there is no constraint as Kot = Rd; in the second
Kot is not closed; and in the third Kot is not convex.
Example 2.4. Bachelier model: no constraint. Similarly to [10, Example 4.11], let k = d, Σ0 =∫ T
0 f
′
tdBt and Ψ =
∫ T
0 ψ
′
tdBt, where f ∈ L2([0, T ];Rd) and ψ ∈ L2([0, T ];Rd×d). Assume ψt is
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invertible, and the map t → ψ−1t is continuous. Clearly, Assumption 2.2 holds, and calculation
shows
Nt(q)
N0(q)
= E
(
−γ
∫ t
0
(fs + ψsq)
′dBs
)
; t ≤ T.
Thus Ht(q) = −γ(ft + ψtq), and hence Kt = Kot = Rd with pit = Ht(Qt) − Ht(0) if and only if
Qt = −(γψt)−1pit.
Example 2.5. Digital claim: a non-closed set. Consider when k = d = 1, Σ0 = 0, and Ψ = 1BT≥0.
Here we have on {Bt = b} and for τ = T − t:
(2.8) Kt = Kot =
1√
τ
ϕ
(
b√
τ
)
×
− 1
Φ
(
b√
τ
) , 1
1− Φ
(
b√
τ
)
 ,
where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal random variable, and ϕ its
probability density function. The left endpoint above occurs as q ↓ −∞, while the right endpoint
occurs as q ↑ ∞. To verify (2.8), we note for Σ0 = 0, Ψ = f(BT ) with f bounded and measurable,
it follows that Ht(q) = −∂bv(t, Bt; q), where v(t, b; q) := − log
(
E
[
e−γqf(BT ) | Bt = b
])
. Indeed,
this can be shown using Itoˆ’s formula and the transition density for B. In this instance
v(t, b; q) = − log
(
e−γq + Φ
(
− b√
T − t
)(
1− e−γq)) .
The result follows by differentiation, the monotonicity of −∂bv(t, Bt; q) with respect to q, and
taking q ↑ ∞, q ↓ −∞.
Example 2.6. Two dimensional digital and linear claim: a closed but non-convex set. Consider when
k = d = 2, Σ0 = 0 and Ψ =
(
B1T , B
1
T 1B2T≥0
)
. Here, with τ = T − t, and on {B1t = b1, B2t = b2}
define A = Φ (−b2/
√
τ) and C =
√
τ/φ (−b2/
√
τ). Then, Kt = Kot = {(p1, p2)} where p1, p2 must
satisfy
− 1
(1−A)C < p2 <
1
AC
; (τp1 − b1)2 ≥ 2τ (1− 2(1−ACp2)(1−A)) log
(
1 + (1−A)Cp2
1−ACp2
)
.
It is easy to see Kot is not convex. Indeed, choose p2 close enough to 1/(AC) to make the right
hand side of the second equality above strictly positive. Then, (p1, p2) 6∈ Kot for p1 near b1/τ while
(p1, p2) ∈ Kot for |p1| large enough. This is shown in Figure 1. Therein, when solving H(q) = p, in
the interior of the shaded region, there are two solutions; along the boundary, but not where the
lines cross, there is a unique solution; and where the lines cross there is an uncountable family of
solutions. This shows the constraint set is closed, but also that typically there will not be a unique
optimal demand policy for the large investor’s optimal investment problem.
3. Optimal Investment with Price Impact
We now consider the investor’s optimal investment problem. We assume she has preferences
described by a utility function U defined on the real line, which is C2, strictly concave, and
satisfies the conditions of reasonable asymptotic elasticity (c.f. [52]). In view of Lemma 2.3, for
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Figure 1. Ko0 for the two-dimensional claim of Example 2.6.
Q ∈ API the wealth process under price impact is well defined, and in turn we can define her value
function, for a given initial capital x and endowment Σ1 by
(3.1) u(x; Σ1) := sup
Q∈API
E [U (x+ VT (Q) + Σ1)] .
To ensure u(x; Σ1) is well defined, we assume
Assumption 3.1. E
[
(U(x+ Σ1))
−] <∞ for all x ∈ R.
Based upon the results of Section 2.2, we can equate u(x; Σ1) with the value function for an
optimal investment problem in the fictitious model with constrained trading, where the investor’s
preferences are described by the utility field
U˜(w,ω) := U
(
1
γ
log(w) + Σ1(ω)
)
; w > 0, ω ∈ Ω.
It is easy to verify that for ω fixed, U˜(w,ω) is strictly increasing, concave, and satisfies the as-
ymptotic elasticity conditions in [36]. Furthermore we know that Q ∈ API ⇔ pi ∈ AC for
pi = H(Q) − H(0), and using (2.6) we conclude, for initial wealth x in the price impact model
and eγx in the fictitious model
U˜ (XT (pi), ·) = U
(
1
γ
log (XT (pi)) + Σ1
)
= U (x+ VT (Q) + Σ1) .
For comparison purposes, we also define the unconstrained problem in the fictitious market, setting
A :=
{
pi ∈ P(F) |
∫ T
0
|pit|2dt <∞ a.s.
}
.
Using U˜ in the fictitious market, we define the value functions
u˜(x; Σ1) := sup
pi∈A
E
[
U˜ (XT (pi),Σ1) | X0 = eγx
]
;
u˜C(x; Σ1) := sup
pi∈AC
E
[
U˜ (XT (pi),Σ1) | X0 = eγx
]
,
(3.2)
and based on the above, we immediately have
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Proposition 3.2. Let Assumptions 2.2 and 3.1 hold, and for x ∈ R let u(x; Σ1) be from (3.1).
Then
u(x; Σ1) = u˜C(x; Σ1) ≤ u˜(x; Σ1).
The unconstrained utility maximization problem for random endowments and utility fields has
been well studied. For endowments with utility functions on (0,∞) we highlight [31], while for
utility fields, we pay particular attention to [41], which contains necessary and sufficient conditions
for existence of optimal policies, in the general incomplete setting. Presently, the analysis greatly
simplifies as the unconstrained market is complete. Indeed,
(3.3) u˜(x; Σ1) = sup
ξ∈L0(FT )
{
E [U(x+ ξ + Σ1)] | E0
[
eγξ
]
≤ 1
}
,
where E0 is expectation with respect to Q0 defined by (recall (2.4) and λ = −H(0))
(3.4)
dQ0
dP
∣∣∣∣
FT
=
e−γΣ0
E [e−γΣ0 ]
= E
(∫ ·
0
Ht(0)
′dBt
)
T
.
To see this, for pi ∈ A set ξ = (1/γ) log(XT (pi))−x. Alternatively, for ξ such that E0
[
eγξ
] ≤ 1 there
is pi ∈ P(F) satisfying E (∫ ·0 pi′t(dBt −Ht(0)dt))T = eγξ/E0 [eγξ], and (1/γ) log(XT (pi)) ≥ x + ξ.
We record for later use that (2.2) implies
(3.5) E0
[
eγVT (Q)
]
≤ 1,
and this budget constraint has major ramifications. Now, the utility maximization problem with
random constraints is also by now standard. However, most of the literature (c.f. [17], [34]), assumes
the constraint set is both closed and convex a.s. for t ≤ T . Closed-ness is used to obtain an optimal
policy when the constraint binds, and convexity is used when constructing the auxiliary markets
with no constraints. However, as shown in Section 2.3, in general one cannot assert Kot of (2.7)
has either of these properties.
Remark 3.3. In light of the above, there is a dichotomy when solving the optimal investment
problem in this class of price impact models. Indeed, under very mild conditions upon U and Σ1
(see, for example, [42]), there is an optimal policy pˆi to the unconstrained problem in (3.2). Then,
in the constrained case, we have two alternatives:
I. pˆi ∈ Ko, Leb[0,T ] × P almost surely.
II. There exists a set (a, b)×E ∈ [0, T ]×FT with a < b and P [E] > 0 s.t. pˆit 6∈ Kot on E×(a, b).
In case I., the constrained problem admits the same answer as the unconstrained problem, and the
constraint is effectively absent. In case II., the optimal investment problem falls outside the scope
of most of the existing literature. In addition, in II., one may end up with a strange situation
where the investor is induced to demand an infinite number of shares from the market maker, and
the market maker, at least formally, is willing to quote a finite cash balance for this demand. For
example, such a situation occurs in Example 2.5, when Σ1 is formed precisely so that pˆi is the left
endpoint in (2.8) for t ∈ (a, b).
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3.1. Exponential preferences. The usefulness of Proposition 3.2 is highlighted when the investor
has exponential utility. Here, exponential utility in the price impact model is connected to power
utility in the fictitious constrained market. To proceed, we denote by α > 0 the absolute risk
aversion of the investor and specify Assumption 3.1 to
Assumption 3.4. E
[
e−αΣ1
]
<∞.
Assumption 3.4 allows us to employ the usual change of measure (c.f. [20]) with the endowment
Σ1, defining P˜ on FT by
(3.6)
dP˜
dP
∣∣∣∣∣
FT
=
e−αΣ1
E [e−αΣ1 ]
.
Using P˜ and that eα((1/γ) log(XT (pi))) = XT (pi)−α/γ , straight-forward calculations imply the following
result (where E˜ stands for the expectation under measure P˜).
Proposition 3.5. Let Assumptions 2.2 and 3.4 hold and recall u˜ and u˜C from (3.2). Then, taking
U(x) = −e−αx, we have
u˜(0; Σ1) =
α
γ
E
[
e−αΣ1
](
sup
pi∈A
E˜
[
1
p
(XT (pi))
p | X0 = 1
])
;
u˜C(0; Σ1) =
α
γ
E
[
e−αΣ1
](
sup
pi∈AC
E˜
[
1
p
(XT (pi))
p | X0 = 1
])
,
(3.7)
where p := −α/γ.
3.2. Solving the optimal investment problem. As we have just seen, price impact manifests
itself in two ways. The first has to do with market incompleteness, induced when Kot 6= Rd. The
second way is due to the altered budget constraint from (3.5), which differs from the “traditional”
constraint EQ0 [V (Q)T ] ≤ 0 in frictionless markets.
Therefore, even when the constraint is absent (i.e. Kot = Rd almost surely on t ≤ T ) and
the market is complete, there is a non-trivial “budget constraint” effect due to price impact. Our
interest lies in this budget constraint impact. Therefore, for the remainder of the article, we assume
the constraint is non-binding (effectively absent). Keeping Assumptions 2.2, 3.4 in force, Ho¨lder’s
inequality ensures
(3.8) E
[
e−β(Σ1+Σ0)
]
<∞; 1
β
:=
1
α
+
1
γ
,
so β is the representative risk aversion of the investor and market maker. Therefore, there exists
ϕˆ ∈ P(F) verifying
(3.9)
e−β(Σ1+Σ0)
E
[
e−β(Σ1+Σ0)
] = E (∫ ·
0
ϕˆ′tdBt
)
T
.
We make the following assumption on Σ0,Ψ and Σ1, which ensures the constraint pˆi ∈ K0 is
non-binding:
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Assumption 3.6. ϕˆ ∈ K, Leb[0,T ] × P almost surely.
Assumption 3.6 states an implicit connection between endowments Σ0 and Σ1 and the tradeable
assets Ψ. As shown below, it holds in many cases of practical interest, and clearly it causes the
constrained and unconstrained optimization problems to coincide. Therefore we have the following
result, the proof of which is in Appendix A.
Proposition 3.7. Let Assumptions 2.2, 3.4 and 3.6 hold. Then, for each of the optimal investment
problems in (3.7), the optimal trading strategy pˆi ∈ AC is pˆi = ϕˆ −H(0), and the value functions
(3.1) and (3.7) coincide, taking the explicit value
−E [e−γΣ0]−αγ × E [e−β(Σ0+Σ1)]αβ .(3.10)
3.3. Indicative examples. There are concrete examples where Assumption 3.6 holds. One easy
example is when Ko = Rd, Leb[0,T ] × P almost surely: as in the Bachelier model of Example 2.4.
We now provide additional examples.
Example 3.8. Markov models. Assume Σ0 = Σ0(YT ) and Ψ = Ψ(YT ) where Y is a diffusion
with dynamics dYt = b(t, Yt)dt + σ(t, Yt)dBt and Y0 = y0. Here Y is understood as an economic
factor. Letting F (y; q) := −γΣ0(y)−γq′Ψ(y), we notice, using the Markov property, that Nt(q) =
v(t, Yt; q) where v(t, y; q) := E
[
eF (YT ;q)|Yt = y
]
. For q fixed, v(·; q) solves the Cauchy problem
vt + Lv = 0, on [0, T )× Rd; v(T, ·) = eF (·;q), on Rd,
where L is the infinitesimal generator of Y . Assume b, σ,Σ0,Ψ are regular enough so there exists
a u ∈ C1,2,0 that solves the above Cauchy problem (see for example [23] for general regularity
results). Using Itoˆ’s formula
dNt(q) = Nt(q)∇y log v(t, Yt; q)σ(t, Yt)dBt.
Thus, Ht(q) = σ(t, Yt)
′∇y log v(t, Yt; q), and the validity of Assumption 3.6 depends on smoothness
and monotonicity properties of the map q 7→ ∇y log v(t, Yt; q). As a matter of fact, Theorem 3 of
[25] shows when d = k = 1; b(t, y) = b(t); σ(t, y) = σ(t); Σ0 and Ψ are of linear growth; and Ψ
strictly monotone in R, then Kt = Kot = R. Interestingly, [25] also provides an example where
Ψ is the payoff of a European call (which is not strictly monotone) and Kt 6= R. In fact, in this
Markovian setting, identifying Kt is equivalent to identifying, for t ≤ T, y ∈ Rd fixed, the range{
σ(t, y)′∇y log v(t, y; q) | q ∈ Rk
}
. To the best of our knowledge, general results of this type are
absent in the literature.
A common assumption in the literature is that Ψ is linear in Σ0,Σ1 (see [2, 26, 37], as well as the
more recent [38, 49]). In other words, agents securitize their risky positions, and through trading
achieve a mutually beneficial risk reduction. The following examples are related to this setting,
and verify Assumption 3.6. Furthermore, within this setting, dynamic trading is not necessary
since the optimal strategy is static.
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Example 3.9. Endowments as portfolios of Ψ and an independent component. Let d = k + n
and write B = (B1, ..., Bk) and B = (Bk+1, ..., Bk+n). For k0, k1 ∈ Rk, assume Σ0 = k′0Ψ + Y0,
Σ1 = k
′
1Ψ + Y1, where Ψ is FBT measurable and Y0, Y1 are FBT measurable. Y0 and Y1 can be
interpreted as the idiosyncratic components of the respective endowments; while the positions in
Ψ are the part invested in the tradeable asset (for the market maker, the latter can be thought as
the aggregate inventory). As (Y0, Y1) and Ψ are independent given Ft for all t ≤ T , it follows that
for q ∈ Rk and t ≤ T
Nt(q) = E
[
e−γ(k0+q)
′Ψ∣∣Ft]E [e−γY0∣∣Ft] .
In (2.1), write H(q) =
(
H(q), H(q)
)
. We see
E
(∫ ·
0
Hu(q)
′dBu
)
T
=
e−γ(k0+q)′Ψ
E
[
e−γ(k0+q)′Ψ
] ; E (∫ ·
0
Hu(q)
′dBu
)
T
=
e−γY0
E [e−γY0 ]
.
As H does not depend upon q, we find Kot =
({
Ht(q)
}
q∈R , 0
)
. Next, recall ϕˆ =
(
ϕˆ, ϕˆ
)
from (3.8)
and (3.9). Due to the independence
E
(∫ ·
0
ϕˆ′tdBt
)
T
=
e−β(k0+k1)
′Ψ
E
[
e−β(k0+k1)′Ψ
] e−β(Y0+Y1)
E
[
e−β(Y0+Y1)
] = E (∫ ·
0
ϕˆ
′
tdBt
)
T
E
(∫ ·
0
ϕˆ′
t
dBt
)
T
.
Since
−β(Σ0 + Σ1) = −γΣ0 − γαΣ1 − γΣ0
α+ γ
,
we see that ϕˆ = H((αk1 − γk0)/(α + γ)), but we can only have ϕˆ = H(0) (i.e. Assumption 3.6)
when αY1 = γY0. Absent this condition, it fails. However, the constraint pi ∈ Ko means we cannot
invest in S, while the optimal demand in S is ϕˆ−H(0). Thus, for the investor, the static position
Qˆt = (αk1 − γk0)/(α + γ), t ≤ T is optimal, and there is no need for dynamic trading. Indeed,
the optimal order puts the market maker and investor at a Pareto-optimal situation (see [11]), and
there is no other mutually beneficial transaction to be made.
Example 3.10. Bachelier model revisited. Our last example shows dynamic optimal trading strate-
gies are possible. We extend the Bachelier model of Example 2.4 by setting Σ1 =
∫ T
0 g
′
tdBt where
g ∈ L2([0, T ];Rd). Assumption 3.6 holds as Kt = Rd, and calculation shows ϕˆ and pˆi from (3.9),
Proposition 3.7 respectively are
ϕˆ = −β (f + g) ; pˆi = ϕˆ−H(0) = γ
α+ γ
(γf − αg) .
Therefore, Qˆ = (1/(α+γ))ψ−1 (αg − γf). Note that the optimal demand is deterministic, but not
necessarily static as it was in Example 3.9. However, when f = ψk0 and g = ψk1 (endowments are
portfolios of Ψ) we recover again static optimal positions.
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4. Contingent Claim Analysis
We arrive at our central topic: obtaining pricing rules and demand schedules for contingent
claims. Our focus is on the budget constraint aspect of price impact, and hence we assume K0t = Rd.
We first ask what it means for a price to be arbitrage-free, since the budget constraint in (3.3) is
clearly not linear in the payoff ξ. This implies non-scalability of arbitrages and hence the topic of
the arbitrage-free contingent claim pricing must be revisited.
We next address the problem of optimal demand by formulating the demand schedule, which
gives how many units of the claim the investor wants to hold at each price (arbitrage-free or not).
As we will see, it is exactly because of the price-impact that even traded prices which create
arbitrage opportunities do not yield infinite demands (i.e. arbitrage is limited).
We then endogenize the traded price as an equilibrium one between two investors who bilat-
erally trade the claim, but hedge in segmented markets. Interestingly, there are cases where the
equilibrium traded price allows for arbitrage.
The claim has terminal payoff h ∈ R. In contrast to the securities with terminal payoff Ψ, h
is not traded through the market maker: the investor trades h with another investor, and then
hedges her position by dynamically trading with the market maker. For example, h can be seen as
the payoff of an illiquid derivative, which is not traded through the market makers but rather it is
traded among two investors or financial institutions (illiquity on some derivative markets has also
been supported by empirical studies, e.g. [14, 15, 21]). To isolate the budget constraint effect, and
satisfy all integrability requirements, we assume
Assumption 4.1. Kot = Rd almost surely for t ≤ T . Furthermore, E
[
e−γΣ0+p(|Ψ|+|h|)
]
< ∞ and
E
[
e−αΣ1+p|h|
]
<∞ for all p ≥ 0.
4.1. Arbitrage-free prices. Fix a position size u ∈ R. Assumption 4.1 implies the investor can
hedge the claim uh. Indeed, with Q0 from (3.4), since E0
[
eγuh
]
< ∞, there is a demand process
Q ∈ API and a (per unit) initial capital h(u) such that uh(u) + VT (Q) = uh a.s.. This follows by
predictable representation, which asserts the existence of a strategy pi ∈ P(F) so that
(4.1)
eγuh
E0 [eγuh]
= E
(∫ ·
0
pi′t(dBt −Ht(0)dt)
)
T
= eγVT (Q),
where the last equality follows solving pit = Ht(Qt)−Ht(0) for Qt. The required initial capital is
(4.2) h(u) :=
1
γu
log
(
E0
[
eγuh
])
,
which is exactly the market maker’s indifference (per unit) value for selling u units of h. As h
is not traded with the market maker, we want to identify prices for h which preclude arbitrage
opportunities from arising when the investor trades Ψ with the market maker. Despite the com-
pleteness implied by Kot = Rd, due to price impact, there need not be only one “arbitrage-free”
price for uh. In fact, we presently develop three notions of an arbitrage-free price, which coincide
in the frictionless case, but give strikingly different answers considering price impact.
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To develop the first two notions, we see from (4.2) that in contrast to the frictionless case, the
replicating capital for −uh is not −uh(u). Rather, it is −uh(u) where
(4.3) h(u) := − 1
γu
log
(
E0
[
e−γuh
])
,
is the market maker’s indifference (per unit) value for buying u units of claim h. Jensen’s inequal-
ity implies h(u) ≤ h(u), which simply verifies the fact that buying value (bid) is less than the
corresponding selling value (ask).
We first define a strong notion of an arbitrage-free price for h, consistent with that in [54]:
Definition 4.2. p is an arbitrage-free for all positions in h, provided for all Q ∈ API and u ∈ R,
if up+ VT (Q)− uh ≥ 0 a.s., then up+ VT (Q)− uh = 0 a.s..
The reasoning behind Definition 4.2 is clear: we rule out the investor being able to start with
nothing, and for some u ∈ R, trade u units of h for a per-unit price of p; trade Ψ with the market
maker over [0, T ]; and cover her position with positive probability of gain at T .
The above definition is strong as it rules out arbitrages for all position sizes u simultaneously.
A weaker notion of an arbitrage-free price is:
Definition 4.3. p is an arbitrage-free at the level u > 0 in h provided
(a) For all Q ∈ API , if up+ VT (Q)− uh ≥ 0 a.s., then up+ VT (Q)− uh = 0 a.s..
(b) For all Q ∈ API , if −up+ VT (Q) + uh ≥ 0 a.s., then −up+ VT (Q) + uh = 0 a.s..
In other words, an arbitrage-free price p for at the level u > 0 rules out arbitrages for either
buying or selling u. Based on these two definitions we obtain the following, proved in Appendix A.
Proposition 4.4. Let Assumption 4.1 hold. Then,
i) The range of arbitrage-free prices for h in the sense of Definition 4.2 is the singleton E0 [h].
ii) For any fixed u > 0, the range of arbitrage-free prices for h in the sense of Definition 4.3
is the closed interval [h(u), h(u)] from (4.2) and (4.3) respectively.
As a consequence of Proposition 4.4, there is an arbitrage opportunity whenever the large investor
finds an ask (resp. bid) price lower (resp. higher) than E0 [h]. Indeed, if the asked (resp. bid) price p
is lower (resp. higher) than E0 [h], there exists a positive number of units u of h, for which p < h(u)
(resp. p > h(u)). Then, an arbitrage opportunity arises buying (resp. selling) u units of h, and
then hedging by dynamically trading Ψ with the market makers. On the other hand, if the only
price for h the investor can find is E0 [h], there is no arbitrage opportunity for any position u ∈ R.
Since h(u) is decreasing in u > 0 and h(u) is increasing in u > 0, we immediately see:
Corollary 4.5. Let Assumption 4.1 hold. If p is an arbitrage-free price at the level u > 0, then p
is an arbitrage-free price at the level u′ for all u′ ≥ u.
According to the LaPlace Principle
(4.4) h(u) ↓ h := essinf (h) ; h(u) ↑ h := esssup (h) as u ↑ ∞.
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Therefore, any price (h, h) 3 p 6= E0 [h], induces an arbitrage, but the arbitrage opportunity is
limited, in the sense there is a maximum number of units of the claim at which the arbitrage can
be exploited. In other words, due to price impact, the arbitrage vanishes if the investor takes
too large a position. Intuitively, large positions on the claim require large hedging positions in
Ψ. This changes the market maker’s inventory, and the resultant pricing rule is to the detriment
of the investor. This sharply departs from arbitrages in markets without price impact, which can
arbitrarily scaled.
Definitions 4.2 and 4.3 do not account for investor preferences. This is an important omission,
because the whole discussion on price impact is dedicated to investors large enough to create price
impact. We now define a third notion, which states that p is an arbitrage-free price if, given the
possibility to purchase arbitrary quantities of h for p, the investor’s optimal demand is finite. To
state it, for a given initial capital x, utility function U , and endowment Σ1, recall the value function
u(x; Σ1) from (3.1).
Definition 4.6. p is a utility-demand based arbitrage-free price for h if for every {un}n∈N such
that
lim
n↑∞
u(x− pun,Σ1 + unh) = sup
u∈R
u(−pu; Σ1 + uh),
we have supn |un| <∞.
Recall β from (3.8) and h, h from (4.4). For exponential preferences, the following result (with
proof in Appendix A) shows the range of demand-based arbitrage-free prices is maximal. This is
in stark contrast to the frictionless case (see [32]).
Proposition 4.7. Let Assumption 4.1 hold, and assume the investor has exponential preferences
with risk aversion α. The range of utility-demand based arbitrage-free prices is (h, h). For p ∈
(h, h), the optimal demand is the unique solution uˆ = uˆ(p) to
(4.5) p =
E
[
he−β(Σ0+Σ1+uˆh)
]
E
[
e−β(Σ0+Σ1+uˆh)
] .
The map p→ uˆ(p) gives the demand schedule.
Propositions 4.4 and 4.7 imply there are arbitrage prices in the sense of Definitions 4.2, 4.3,
at which the investor’s optimal demand is finite. Indeed, this holds for all (h, h) 3 p 6= E0 [h].
However, the arbitrage gain is limited, and the investor may want to trade the claim for hedging
purposes. If, for instance, the claim is negatively correlated with her endowment, she has motive
to take a long position (even if p > E0 [h], meaning that the arbitrage is provided by a short
position). When the benefits from hedging exceed the (limited) arbitrage, the optimal demand
does not exploit it (i.e. the investor optimally ignores the arbitrage opportunity). The following
example reinforces this point.
Example 4.8. We revisit the Bachelier model of Examples 2.4 and 3.10, and assume h =
∫ T
0 y
′
tdBt,
where y ∈ L2([0, T ];Rd). Assumption 4.1 readily holds and hence any position u in h can be
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hedged. Simple calculations show E0 [h] = −γ
∫ T
0 y
′
tftdt, along with
h(u) = E0 [h] +
1
2
γu
∫ T
0
|yt|2dt; h(u) = E0 [h]−
1
2
γu
∫ T
0
|yt|2dt.
The (linear) optimal demand schedule p→ uˆ(p) from (4.5) is
(4.6) uˆ(p) = −p+ β
∫ T
0 y
′
t(ft + gt)dt
β
∫ T
0 |yt|2dt
= −
p+ αCov
[
h, VT (Qˆ(0)) + Σ1
]
βVar [h]
,
where Qˆ(0) is the optimal order flow with (endowment Σ1 but) no claim, and the last equality
follows using Example 3.10 at Σ1 =
∫ T
0 g
′
tdBt. Next, a direct calculation specifying Example 3.10
to Σ1 =
∫ T
0 g
′
tdBt + uˆ(p)h shows for the optimal strategy Qˆ = Qˆ(uˆ(p))
−puˆ(p) + VT (Qˆ) + uˆ(p)h = Constant + 1
α+ γ
∫ T
0
(γft + γuˆ(p)yt − αgt)′ dBt.
Thus, the large investor does not utilize an arbitrage strategy (save for the pathological case when
γft + γuˆ(p)yt − αgt ≡ 0 which can only happen if a) γft − αgt ∝ yt and b) the traded price is
p = −α ∫ T0 y′tgtdt.)
Relation (4.6) implies uˆ(p) > 0 if and only if p < −αCov
[
h, VT (Qˆ(0)) + Σ1
]
. This is intuitive
because if h is negatively correlated with the large investor’s (optimal) terminal wealth absent
the claim, then she has a hedging-related incentive to purchase h, and will take long positions
at higher prices. Furthermore, if uˆ(p) > 0, then, as shown in the proof of Proposition 4.4, in
order to rule out arbitrages of the form −puˆ(p) + V (Q)T + ph we must have p ≥ h(uˆ(p)). Writing
p = −αCov
[
h, V (Qˆ(0))T + Σ1
]
− ε for some ε > 0 we find (see again Example 3.10)
p− h(uˆ(p)) = γ − α
2α
ε+ γCov
[
h, VT (Qˆ(0))
]
.
For the sake of clarity, assume γ = α. Here, arbitrages arise (but are not used by the large investor)
when Cov
[
h, VT (Qˆ(0))
]
< 0. In this instance, the large investor’s hedging demands outweigh the
desire to incorporate the arbitrage.
Expectation E0 [h] provides a unique arbitrage-free price in the sense of Definition 4.2, but this
definition is far too restrictive, as it yields no connection between arbitrage-free prices and optimal
positions. However, the range of prices which lead to finite demands (i.e. arbitrage-free in the
sense of Definition 4.6) is maximally wide. One way to obtain unique price, or “value”, for h which
takes into account investor preferences, is through indifference valuation. Define the (per unit, bid)
indifference value pI for u units of h through the balance equation
u(x− upI ; Σ1 + uh) = u(x; Σ1).
For exponential preferences, pI is independent of x, and hence we write pI(u; Σ1). Furthermore,
from Proposition 3.7 we obtain the explicit formula
(4.7) pI (u; Σ1) = − 1
αu
log
(
u(0; Σ1 + uh)
u(0; Σ1)
)
= − 1
βu
log
(
E
[
e−β(Σ0+Σ1+uh)
]
E
[
e−β(Σ0+Σ1)
] ) ,
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Note that pI depends on the large investor’s endowment and risk aversion. As such, it need not be
arbitrage-free in the sense of Definitions 4.2, 4.3, however, it is always arbitrage-free in the sense
of Definition 4.6.
4.2. Optimal demands and endogenous large positions. Recall that 1/β = 1/α+ 1/γ is the
combined risk tolerance of the investor and market maker. Using the results of Section 3, together
with the general theory developed in [5], we now show that optimal demands are on the order of
1/β, and hence large positions arise endogenously as either the investor’s or market maker’s risk
aversion vanishes. To this latter point, the two situations consistent with γ → 0 are when the
number of market makers increases (as this implies growth in the aggregate risk tolerance 1/γ) and
as an approximation to market maker risk-neutrality. In fact, the assumption of risk neutral market
makers is common in micro-structure literature (c.f. [39] and the references therein). Remarkably,
despite the investor’s price impact, large positions in h endogenously arise as γ → 0, even if the
investor’s risk aversion α remains fixed.
To heuristically see why optimal positions are on the order of 1/β as β → 0, let p ∈ (h, h) and
uˆ be the optimal demand from (4.5). Keep p,Σ0,Σ1 fixed, and let β → 0. Then, uˆβ → 0 implies
necessarily that p = E [h], and uβ →∞ (respectively −∞) implies p = h (resp. h); a contradiction.
Thus, for all traded prices p except E [h], it must be that uˆβ ≈ ` for some constant ` 6= 0.
We now make the above precise, considering a sequence βn → 0. Let Assumption 4.1 hold, and
to be consistent with [5], set
rn :=
1
βn
=
1
αn
+
1
γn
→∞,
as the aggregate risk tolerance. From (4.7), we see that along the rate u = `rn, ` ∈ R \ {0}
pI (`rn; Σ1) = −1
`
log
(
E
[
e−`h−βn(Σ0+Σ1)
]
E
[
e−βn(Σ0+Σ1)
] ) .
Then, as established in [5, Section 6.2], the dominated convergence theorem yields
p∞(`) := lim
n→∞ p
I (`rn; Σ1) = −1
`
log
(
E
[
e−`h
])
.(4.8)
Remark 4.9. The assumption that endowments Σ0,Σ1 are independent of n can be relaxed. For
example, consider when there are n → ∞ market makers with identical risk aversions γ > 0
and endowments Σ0. Here, the representative market maker’s risk aversion is γn = γ/n and the
aggregate endowment is Σn0 = nΣ0 = (γ/γn)Σ0. In other words, even as γn → 0, γnΣn = γΣ 6→ 0,
and hence the representative market maker’s risk neutrality does not necessarily correspond to zero
endowment. Here, the limit in (4.8) is
lim
n→∞ p
I (`rn; Σ1) = −1
`
log
(
E
[
e−`h−γΣ0
]
E [e−γΣ0 ]
)
.
More generally, our analysis can handle endowments grow at the rate rn, and this assumption is
reasonable for a large number of market makers.
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Limiting indifference values and endogenous large positions are connected using the theory de-
veloped in [5]. Indeed, for p ∈ (h, h) and n ∈ N fixed, Proposition 4.7 yields a unique optimal
demand uˆn(p). The convergence in (4.8), together with the continuity of ` → p∞(`) at ` = 0,
verifies Assumption 3.3 of [5] and hence by [5, Theorems 4.3, 4.4], as rn → ∞ it holds for all
p 6= p∞(0) that
0 < lim inf
n→∞
|uˆn(p)|
rn
≤ lim sup
n→∞
|uˆn(p)|
rn
<∞.
Thus, optimal positions become large at the rate rn. In fact, [5, Corollary 4.6] improves upon this
by showing that since ` 7→ `p∞(`) is strictly convex
(4.9) lim
n→∞
uˆn(p)
rn
= ` ∈ R \ {0}.
Recall p∞(0) = E [h] (or p∞(0) = E
[
he−γΣ0
]
/E
[
e−γΣ0
]
if the endowment does not vanish as in
Remark 4.9). Therefore, whenever p 6= p∞(0), the optimal demand increases in magnitude to ∞
exactly at the rate rn. The price p
∞(0) is the limit of the arbitrage-free prices E0,n [h] in the
sense of Definition 4.2 (as well as Definition 4.3 for u fixed as n →∞), so p 6= p∞(0) corresponds
to the large investor obtaining a very advantageous price as the market makers approach risk
neutrality. Lastly, we remark that [5, Corollary 4.6] verifies (4.9) for any sequence of traded prices
{pn}n∈N ⊂ (h, h) provided pn → p 6= p∞(0). There is no need for p to be fixed across all n.
We end this section with an observation. [5] makes a general connection between endogenously
rising large positions and asymptotic market completeness (c.f. Section 6.2 therein). Since we are
assuming Kot = Rd, for any level of market maker risk aversion, the market with price impact is
complete. Therefore, the “asymptotic market completeness” of [5] corresponds, not to the vanishing
inability to hedge claims in the price impact model, but rather to “asymptotic market maker risk
neutrality” in the price impact model. However, it is possible to associate asymptotic market maker
risk neutrality with asymptotic completeness, and this is done through the lens of basis risk models
(c.f. [19]). To see this, we extend the probability space to support a d-dimensional Brownian motion
W independent of B, and denote by FW,B the P-augmentation of (B,W )’s natural filtration. Next,
we define ρ :=
√
α/(α+ γ) ∈ (0, 1) and ρ¯ :=
√
1− ρ2 and consider a fictitious market with d
tradeable assets with price process S evolving as
dSt
St
= ρ (dBt −Ht(0)dt) + ρ¯dWt; t ≤ T.
Thus, ρ measures the correlation between hedgeable and un-hedgeable shocks, and ρ → 1 as
γ → 0. In this market, trading strategies θ represent the dollar positions in S, and the induced
wealth process X(θ) has dynamics dXt(θ) = θ
′
tρ(dBt − Ht(0)dt) + ρ¯θ′tdWt, for t ≤ T . Now, let
pi ∈ A or pi ∈ AC be a strategy from Section 3 and consider θ = pi/(γρ). By first conditioning on
F = FB, straight-forward calculations show that under Assumptions 2.2 and 3.4
u˜(0; Σ1) = sup
θ∈A/(γρ)
E
[
−e−α(XT (θ)+Σ1)
]
; u˜br,C(0; Σ1) = sup
θ∈AC/(γρ)
E
[
−e−α(XT (θ)+Σ1)
]
.
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Therefore, we see how market maker risk aversion can directly be linked to a measure of market
incompleteness, even though the original price impact model is complete.
5. Segmented markets and partial equilibrium price and quantities
Our final section endogenizes the traded price through equilibrium arguments. Recall that for
any traded price p ∈ (h, h), if p 6= E0 [h] then an arbitrage opportunity arises. Also, there is a
unique p∞(0) such that large positions endogenously arise whenever a) traded price differs from
p∞(0) and b) the representative risk aversion γ tends to 0. In this section, we provide justification
that such prices p occur in equilibrium.
We consider a segmented market. Segmented market models are common in financial literature:
for example, see [45, 46], where the investors’ role is played by “arbitrageurs”, and the market
makers are competitive, price-taking investors. Here, we assume there are two market makers (A
and B) with different endowments ΣA0 ,Σ
B
0 and tradeable security payoffs Ψ
A, ΨB. By “segmented”
we mean A and B do not trade with one another. Similarly, there are two investors with endow-
ments ΣA1 , Σ
B
1 , and utility functions UA, UB. Each investor trades with her respective “local”
market maker. The investors also trade h with one another, in the form of a bilateral OTC trans-
action (similarly to the trades between arbitrageurs in [45, 46]). The idea is that market makers in
a specific product/region/market are not necessarily involved in other products/regions/markets
(e.g. those with different transaction costs, regulation, geography, security contracting, etc.) and
investors may wish to trade with each other, in addition to their local market makers, to offset
risk.
The investors seek both a quantity u and price p at which to trade. To determine these values, we
use the notion of Partial Equilibrium Price Quantity (PEPQ) from [6], and say a pair (p∗, u∗) ∈ R2
is a PEPQ provided
u∗ ∈ argmax
u∈R
{uA(xA − p∗u,ΣA + uh)}
⋂
argmax
u∈R
{uB(xB + p∗u,ΣB − uh)} ,
where uA and uB are the investors’ value functions. As such, a PEPQ ensures bilateral clearing
when acting optimally. For exponential utilities, the analysis simplifies, since (4.7) implies (p∗, u∗)
is a PEPQ provided
u∗ ∈ argmax
u∈R
{
upI,A(u,ΣA1 )− p∗u
}⋂
argmax
u∈R
{
p∗u− upI,B(−u,ΣB1 )
}
.
Define the local combined risk tolerances 1/βi := 1/γi + 1/αi for i ∈ {A,B}. Using [6, Theorem
5.8], we obtain the following:
Proposition 5.1. Let Assumption 4.1 hold for both markets. If βA(Σ
A
0 + Σ
A
1 )− βB(ΣB0 + ΣB1 ) is
not constant, there is a unique PEPQ (p∗, u∗). In fact
u∗ = argmax
u∈R
{upI,A (u; ΣA1 )+ upI,B (−u; ΣB1 )},
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and
(5.1) p∗ =
E
[
he−βA(ΣA0 +ΣA1 +u∗h)
]
E
[
e−βA(ΣA0 +ΣA1 +u∗h)
] = E
[
he−βB(ΣB0 +ΣB1 −u∗h)
]
E
[
e−βB(ΣB0 +ΣB1 −u∗h)
] .
In other words, the partial equilibrium price p∗ is the marginal valuation of both large investors
when their endowments include the equilibrium quantity u∗. In view of Proposition 4.4, the equi-
librium price need not be arbitrage-free since there are cases where it lies outside of the range
[h(u∗), h(u∗)], for both investors. The reasoning stems from the discussion on limited arbitrages.
In particular, if h is negatively correlated with the endowment of investor A and positively corre-
lated with the endowment of investor B, u∗ will be positive, due to the hedging benefits. On the
other hand, the existing market makers’ inventories in both markets may induce relatively high
indifference prices for h in market A and relatively low prices in market B. Even if these prices are
outside of the non-arbitrage range, the mutual benefits of hedging force the investor to the other
direction of the transaction. The following example reinforces this point.
Example 5.2. For i ∈ {A,B}, we again consider the Bachelier model of Examples 2.4, 3.10 and 4.8.
Indifference valuation (4.7) yields for i ∈ {A,B}
pI,i
(
u; Σi1
)
= −β
i
2
∫ T
0
(
uyt + 2(f
i
t + g
i
t)
)′
ytdt.
From Proposition 5.1, the unique equilibrium quantity is
u∗ =
∫ T
0
(
βB(fBt + g
B
t )− βA(fAt + gAt )
)′
ytdt
(βA + βB)
∫ T
0 y
′
tytdt
.
The equilibrium price is
p∗ = −Γ
∫ T
0
(
fAt + g
A
t + f
B
t + g
B
t
)′
ytdt;
1
Γ
=
1
αA
+
1
αB
+
1
γA
+
1
γB
,
so that Γ is the aggregate risk tolerance. Clearly, there is no reason for p∗ to be the unique (for the
respective markets) arbitrage-free price in the sense of Definition 4.2. In particular, if endowments
Σij for i = A,B; j = 0, 1 are sufficiently different, the equilibrium quantity is large, provided
βi, i = A,B are both near 0. This means neither investor exploits an arbitrage when trading with
her respective market maker. This departs from segmented market models with no price impact,
where investors both create and mutually exploit arbitrage opportunities: see [45, 46].
5.1. Large partial equilibrium quantities. We saw in Section 4.2 that an investor (whose risk
aversion is fixed) will endogenously own a large position in the contingent claim h provided a) the
market maker risk aversion γ ≈ 0 and b) the traded price p is not the unique p∞(0). Presently, we
show the above conditions arise endogenously in two stylized, but representative, situations. First,
when one investor has an existing large position in the claim, and second when each market has a
large number of market makers.
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Example 5.3. Investor B in the large claim regime, market makers near risk neutrality. Assume
γA, γB → 0, with ΣA0 ,ΣB0 fixed. Investor A has no endowment, while investor B has endowment
`/γBh, ` 6= 0, so she is in the large claim regime. The equilibrium pricing formula (5.1) specifies to
p∗ =
E
[
he
− γAαA
γA+αA
(ΣA0 +u
∗h)
]
E
[
e
− γAαA
γA+αA
(ΣA0 +u
∗h)
] = E
[
he
− γBαB
γB+αB
(
ΣB0 +
(
`
γB
−u∗
)
h
)]
E
[
e
− γBαB
γB+αB
(
ΣB0 +
(
`
γB
−u∗
)
h
)] .
Let γA, γB → 0 and assume γA/γB → δ ∈ (0,∞). If p∗ → p∞(0) = E [h] then necessarily the
equation for B implies u∗ ≈ `/γB. However, by considering the equation for A, this in turn implies
p∗ = E
[
he−`δh
]
/E
[
e−`δh
] 6= E [h]. Thus, it must be that p∗ does not limit to p∞(0), and large
positions endogenously arise for A. In fact, it is easy to see that u∗ ≈ `/(γA + γB).
Example 5.4. Large number of market makers. This example emphasizes that, under the presence of
price impact, the large (equilibrium) positions on a claim could arise even when the large investors’
initial endowments do not contain any position on the claim. As in Remark 4.9, we assume for
each n there are n market makers with risk aversion γi and endowment Σi0 (in each local market
i ∈ {A,B}). We let each large investor have fixed endowment, and in fact without loss of generality
(for this example), set Σi1 = 0. Here, (5.1) specifies to
p∗ =
E
[
he
− γAαA
γA/n+αA
(
ΣA0 +
u∗n
n
h
)]
E
[
e
− γAαA
γA/n+αA
(
ΣA0 +
u∗n
n
h
)] = E
[
he
− γBαB
γB/n+αB
(
ΣB0 −
u∗n
n
h
)]
E
[
e
− γBαB
γB/n+αB
(
ΣB0 − u
∗
n
n
h
)] .
Now, assume optimal positions are dominated by n in that |u∗n|/n→ 0. As n ↑ ∞, this implies
E
[
he−γAΣA0
]
E
[
e−γAΣA0
] = E
[
he−γBΣB0
]
E
[
e−γBΣB0
] .
Therefore, we see that except in the highly particular case when the above equality holds, large
positions will “spontaneously” (i.e. when neither large investor owns a position in h ahead of time)
arise as the number of market makers becomes large.
Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2.3. From [8, Theorem 3.2] and [10, Theorem 4.9] we know that under Assumption
2.2 the gains process is well defined for all locally bounded predictable strategies Q. It remains to
obtain the explicit expression for V in (2.2). Using the notation of [8, 10], for (v, x, q) ∈ (0,∞)×
R× Rd and (u, y, q) ∈ (−∞, 0)× (0,∞)× Rd define Σ(x, q) := Σ0 + x+ q′Ψ, r(v, x) := −ve−γx,
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Ft(v, x, q) := E
[
r(v,Σ(x, q)
∣∣Ft] and Gt(u, y, q) := supv>0 infx∈R (uv + xy − Ft(v, x, q)). Direct
calculation yields
Ft(v, x, q) = −ve−γxNt(q); Gt(u, y, q) = y
γ
log
(
Nt(q)
−u
)
.(A.1)
Following the terminology of [10, Equations (3.19) and (4.16)], we define the market maker’s
expected utility process {Ut}t≤T by Ut = Ut(v, x, q) = (∂/∂v)Ft(v, x, q) for t ≤ T . From (2.1)
and (A.1), we readily get that Ut will solve the affine stochastic differential equation dUt/Ut =
Ht(Qt)
′dBt for t ≤ T , which admits the explicit strong solution
Ut = U0E
(∫ ·
0
Hs(Qs)
′dBs
)
t
; U0 = E
[−e−γΣ0] = −N0(0),
provided Q ∈ API . Continuing and slightly abusing the notation, [10, Equation (4.19)] implies the
gains process Vt(Q) is
Vt(Q) = −Gt(Ut, 1, 0) = −1
γ
log
(
Nt(0)
−Ut(Q)
)
;
= −1
γ
log
(
Nt(0)
N0(0)
)
+
1
γ
∫ t
0
Hs(Qs)
′dBs − 1
2γ
∫ t
0
|Hs(Qs)|2ds.
Now, from (2.1) we know Nt(0)/N0(0) = E
(∫ ·
0 Hs(0)
′dBs
)
t
, which implies
Vt(Q) =
1
γ
∫ t
0
(Hs(Qs)−Hs(0))′dBs − 1
2γ
∫ t
0
(|Hs(Qs)|2 − |Hs(0)|2) ds.
The latter expression coincides with (2.2), finishing the proof.

Proof of Proposition 3.7. In light of Proposition 3.5 it suffices to show both u˜C(0; Σ1) and u˜(0; Σ1)
take the value in (3.10). From (3.4), (3.6), the density of the (unique) martingale measure Q0 with
respect to P˜ on FT is
(A.2) Z˜T =
dQ0
dP˜
∣∣∣∣
FT
=
dQ0
dP
∣∣∣∣
FT
× dP
dP˜
∣∣∣∣
FT
=
E
[
e−αΣ1
]
E [e−γΣ0 ]
eαΣ1−γΣ0 .
Recall from Proposition 3.5 that p = −α/γ and q := p/(p − 1) = α/(α + γ). A straight-forward
calculation shows
(A.3) Z˜qT =
(
E
[
e−αΣ1
]
E [e−γΣ0 ]
) α
α+γ e−β(Σ0+Σ1)
e−αΣ1
.
Thus, E˜
[
Z˜qT
]
< ∞ and by the standard complete market duality theory for power utility with
initial wealth eγ×0 = 1 (c.f. [34], [29, Lemma 5]) we obtain by explicit computation
u˜(0,Σ1) =
α
γ
E
[
e−αΣ1
](1
p
E˜
[
Z˜qT
]1−p)
= −E [e−γΣ0]−αγ × E [e−β(Σ0+Σ1)]αβ .
As for pˆi, the (sufficient, c.f. [29, Lemma 5]) first order conditions for optimality are
(A.4) XT (pˆi)Z˜T = Z˜
q
T ×
(
E˜
[
Z˜qT
])−1
.
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For a given strategy pi (and x = 0) recall the log wealth process in (2.5). Using (3.4), (3.9), (A.2)
and (A.3), the log of the right hand side in (A.4) reduces to∫ T
0
(ϕˆt −Ht(0))′ (dBt −Ht(0)dt)− 1
2
∫ T
0
|ϕˆt −Ht(0)|2dt.
From here, it is clear pˆi = ϕˆ−H(0). Assumption 3.6 implies pˆi ∈ AC , completing the proof.

Proof of Proposition 4.4. We first prove the statement regarding Definition 4.3. To this end, fix
u > 0, p ∈ R and Q ∈ API . Set W (Q) = up+ VT (Q)− uh and note
E0
[
eγ(uh+W (Q))
]
E0 [eγuh]
=
eγupE0
[
eγVT (Q)
]
E0 [eγuh]
≤ e
γup
E0 [eγuh]
= eγu(p−h(u)),
where the inequality used (2.2). Therefore, if p ≤ h(u) then p satisfies part (a) in Definition 4.3.
If p > h(u), we observe for Q ∈ API from (4.1)
W (Q) = up+ VT (Q)− uh = u(p− h(u)),
so p does not satisfy part (a) of Definition 4.3. This gives the upper bound. For the lower bound,
now set W˜ (Q) = −up+ VT (Q) + uh. We then have
E0
[
eγ(−uh+W˜ (Q))
]
E0 [e−γuh]
=
e−γupE0
[
eγVT (Q)
]
E0 [e−γuh]
≤ e
−γup
E0 [e−γuh]
= e−γu(p−h(u)).
Therefore if p ≥ h(u), then p satisfies part (b) in Definition 4.3. If p < h(u), we observe for Q ∈ API
from (4.1) with −h replacing h
W˜ (Q) = −up+ VT (Q) + uh = u(−p+ h(u)),
so that p does not satisfy part (b) of Definition 4.3. This gives the lower bound, finishing the result
for Definition 4.3.
For item i), we note that if p is arbitrage-free in the sense of Definition 4.2, then for all u > 0, p
is arbitrage-free in the sense of Definition 4.3, and hence for all u > 0 we must have
− 1
γu
log
(
E0
[
e−γuh
])
≤ p ≤ 1
γu
log
(
E0
[
eγuh
])
.
Ho¨lder’s inequality shows the function on the left side above is decreasing in u > 0 and the function
on the right is increasing in u. Furthermore, by the dominated convergence theorem, the limit as
u ↓ 0 of each of these functions is E0 [h]. Thus, E0 [h] is arbitrage-free in the sense of Definition
4.3 for all u > 0. Also, since for all Q ∈ API , E
[
eγVT (Q)
] ≤ 1, we see E0 [h] is also (vacuously)
arbitrage-free at u = 0. Finally, by the symmetry of Definition 4.3 we see E0 [h] is also the only
arbitrage-free price in the sense of Definition 4.2, even for u < 0. 
Proof of Proposition 4.7. Using Proposition 3.7 with large investor endowment Σ1 + uh, we see
u(−pu; Σ1 + uh) = −eαpuE
[
e−γΣ0
]−αγ × E [e−β(Σ0+Σ1+uh)]αβ .
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Thus, the optimization problem is to minimize
pu +
1
β
log
(
E
[
e−β(Σ0+Σ1+uh)
])
,
over u ∈ R. Under the given integrability assumptions the above function is both smooth and
strictly convex in u. The first order conditions for optimality are (4.5), and that the right hand
side of (4.5) goes to h (resp. h) as u goes to ∞ (resp. −∞) has been shown in [47]. 
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